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Abstract
Sensitive information is present on our phones, disks, watches and
computers. Its protection is essential. Plausible deniability of stored data
allows individuals to deny that their device contains a piece of sensitive
information. This constitutes a key tool in the fight against oppressive
governments and censorship. Unfortunately, existing solutions, such as
the now defunct TrueCrypt [5], can defend only against an adversary
that can access a users device at most once (single-snapshot adversary).
Recent solutions have traded significant performance overheads for the
ability to handle more powerful adversaries able to access the device at
multiple points in time (multi-snapshot adversary). In this paper we show
that this sacrifice is not necessary. We introduce and build DataLair1, a
practical plausible deniability mechanism. When compared with exist-
ing approaches, DataLair is two orders of magnitude faster for public
data accesses, and 5 times faster for hidden data accesses. An important
component in DataLair is a new write-only ORAM construction which
improves on the complexity of the state of the art write-only ORAM by
a factor of O(logN), where N denotes the underlying storage disk size.
1 Introduction
With increasing amounts of sensitive data being stored on portable stor-
age devices, disk encryption has become a necessity. Although full disk
encryption (FDE) tools (such as dm-crypt) provide protection against
unauthorized adversaries attempting to access sensitive data at rest, it
does not allow the owner to deny possession of sensitive data. This is a
1A preliminary version of this paper was present as a poster [28] with an overview of the
technical solution described here, and as a full paper [27]. This paper additionally addresses
security concerns raised by a recent private email conversation [26] in Section 4.3.
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serious challenge in the presence of oppressive regimes and other power-
ful adversaries that may want to coerce the user into revealing encryption
keys. Unfortunately, this is an all-too-common occurrence as illustrated by
numerous examples [24, 25], where sensitive data in possession of human
rights activists have been subject to government scrutiny in oppressive
regimes, thus endangering the witnesses.
Plausible deniability (PD) provides a strong defense against such co-
ercion. A system with PD allows its users to deny the existence of stored
sensitive information or the occurrence of a sensitive transaction[15].
An example of a plausibly deniable storage solution is the successful,
yet unfortunately now-defunct TrueCrypt [5]. TrueCrypt divides a disk
into multiple “password-protected” volumes and allows some of these vol-
umes to be “hidden” in order to store sensitive data. Password-derived
encryption keys are used to encrypt each such volume. Upon coercion,
a user can plausibly deny the existence of a hidden volume by simply
providing a valid password for one of the non-hidden ones, thus showing
a plausible use for the disk without revealing the hidden volume data.
TrueCrypt stores hidden volumes in the free space of non-hidden (public)
volumes. To mask their existence, TrueCrypt fills all free space with ran-
dom data and encrypts the hidden data with a randomized semantically
secure encryption scheme with output indistinguishable from random.
However, as pointed out by Czeskis [9], TrueCrypt is not secure against
an adversary that can access the disk at multiple points in time (e.g.,
multiple security checks or border crossings). In such scenarios, an ad-
versary can save a disk snapshot and compare subsequent snapshots with
it. Changes to free space occurring between snapshots will suggest the
existence of hidden data.
A major reason why TrueCrypt fails to provide PD against an adver-
sary with multiple snapshots is because it does not attempt to hide access
patterns. The adversary can point out exact locations on disk that have
changed in between snapshots and notice that the apparently free portion
of the disk (potentially containing hidden data) appears altered.
To defeat a multi-snapshot adversary, we need to eliminate all evidence
of hidden data and its corresponding accesses – for example by ensuring
that all modifications on the disk are attributable and indistinguishable
from the traces of public data operations.
This means that modifications to apparently free space should be part
of normal behavior of plausible public operations and the traces of hidden
data accesses should be indistinguishable from the traces of public data
accesses.
One effective way to achieve this is to “cloak” hidden accesses within
public data accesses by always performing a public operation for every
hidden operation. Further, oblivious access mechanisms (ORAM) can
be used for randomizing accesses and making them indistinguishable [7].
Unfortunately, ORAMs come with very high overheads and reduce overall
throughput by orders of magnitude.
Fortunately, a new insight emerges that enables a significant through-
put increase: accesses to public data do not need to be hidden since the
existence of public data is admitted. In fact, revealing access patterns
to public data reinforces deniability as it shows non-hidden disk use to a
2
curious adversary.
Consequently, DataLair uses this insight to design a significantly more
efficient way to achieve strong PD: protecting only operations on the hid-
den data, while ensuring that they are indistinguishable from operations
on public data (thus allowing the user to claim that all I/O to the disk
is due to public accesses). Further, DataLair also optimizes the oblivious
access mechanism deployed for hidden data.
In summary, public data is accessed (almost) directly without the
need to use an oblivious access mechanism while hidden data accesses are
mitigated through a new throughput-optimized write-only ORAM which
significantly reduces access complexity when compared to existing work
[7, 12]. As a result, DataLair is two orders of magnitude faster for public
data accesses, and 5 times faster for hidden data accesses, when compared
to existing work.
2 Related Work
Plausible deniability (PD) was first proposed in relation to deniable en-
cryption [8]. Deniable encryption uses cryptographic techniques to allow
decrypting the same ciphertext to different plaintexts.
Filesystem Level PD. For storage devices, Anderson et al. first ex-
plored the idea of steganographic filesystems and proposed two solutions
for hiding data in [6]. The first solution is to use a set of cover files and
their linear combinations to reconstruct hidden files. The ability to cor-
rectly compute the linear combination required to reconstruct a file was
based on the knowledge of a user-defined password. The second solution
was to use a hash based scheme for storing files at locations determined
by the hash of the filename. This requires storing multiple copies of the
same file at different locations to prevent data loss. Macdonald and Kahn
[14] designed and implemented an optimized steganographic filesystem for
Linux, that is derived from the second solution proposed in [6]. Pang et
al. [17] further improved on the previous constructions by avoiding hash
collisions and more efficient storage.
The solutions based on steganographic filesystem only defend against
a single-snapshot adversary. Han et al. [11] designed a steganographic
filesystem that allows multiple users to share the same hidden file. Fur-
ther, runtime relocation of data ensures deniability against an adversary
with multiple snapshots. However, the solution does not scale well to
practical scenarios as deniability is attributed to joint-ownership of sensi-
tive data. Defy [18] is a log structured file system for flash devices that
offers PD using secure deletion. Although, Defy protects against a multi-
snapshot adversary, it does so by storing all filesystem related metadata
in the memory, which does not scale well for memory constrained systems
with large external storage devices.
Block device level PD. At device-level, disk encryption tools such as
Truecrypt [5] and Rubberhose [4] provide deniability but cannot protect
against a multi-snapshot adversary. Mobiflage [20] also provides PD for
mobile devices against a single-snapshot adversary. Blass et al. [7] were
the first to deal with deniability against a multi-snapshot adversary at
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device level. The solution in [7] deploys a write-only ORAM for mapping
data from logical volumes to an underlying storage device and hiding
access patterns for hidden data within reads to non-hidden (public) data.
3 Model
We focus on storage-centric plausible deniability (PD) as in the results
discussed above, but we note that PD has also been defined in more
general frameworks [3].
Plausible Deniability in real life. It is important to understand how-
ever that the mere use of a system with PD capability may raise suspicion!
This is particularly the case if PD-enabled systems have high overheads
or are outright impractical when accessed for public data storage. This is
why it is important to design mechanisms that are practical and do not
impede the use of the device, especially for storing non-sensitive data. We
envision a future where all block device logic is endowed with a PD mode
of operation.
3.1 Preliminaries
Adversary. We consider a computationally bounded “multi-snapshot”
adversary that has the power to coerce the user into providing a password.
As in existing research [7], we also assume that the device user is not
directly observed by the adversary during writes – a small amount of
volatile memory is being used during reads and writes and is inaccessible
to the adversary that can only see static device snapshots.
Configuration. While we note that there may be a number of other
ways to achieve PD , our focus is on a practical solution involving storage
devices with multiple logical volumes, independently encrypted with user
password-derived keys.
To protect her sensitive data from adversaries, a user may write it
encrypted to one of these logical volumes (the “hidden” volume). For
PD, the user may choose to also write non-sensitive data to a “public”
volume, encrypted with a key which can be provided to an adversary as
proof of plausible device use.
Logical and physical blocks. For a block device hosting multiple
logical (hidden or public) volumes, clients address data within each volume
using logical block addresses. The data is stored on the underlying device
using physical block addresses.
Access patterns. We define an access pattern informally as an ordered
sequence of logical block reads and writes.
Write traces. We define a write trace as the actual modifications to
physical blocks due to the execution of a corresponding access pattern.
Solution Space. While there might be multiple ways to achieve PD in
a multi-volume multi-snapshot adversary setting, one idea [7] is to “hide”
operations to the hidden volume “within” operations to the public volume.
This prevents the adversary from gathering any information regarding user
access patterns to the hidden volume (hidden data access) by ensuring that
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the user can plausibly attribute any and all writes traces as accesses to
the public volume (public data access) instead. On coercion, the user
can provide the credentials for the public volume and thus plausibly deny
the existence of the hidden data. Arguably, otherwise, in the absence of
public volume operations, an adversary could question the reason for any
observed changes to the space allocated for the hidden volume and then
rightfully suspect the existence of a hidden volume.
Atomicity. As in existing work, a very small number of physical block
I/O ops (corresponding to one DataLair read/write operation) are as-
sumed to be performed as atomic transactions. The adversary may gain
access only after entire transactions have completed (or rolled back). This
is reasonable since the user is unlikely to perform any sensitive operation
in the presence of an adversary.
Access pattern indistinguishability. Computational indistinguisha-
bility of traces has been widely discussed in ORAM literature [13, 21].
Further, most ORAMs employ randomization techniques which ensure
that the write traces generated due to accesses are indistinguishable from
random. As will be detailed later, indistinguishability of access patterns
is one of the main requirements to achieve PD.
We also define the link between access patterns and write traces.
Definition 1. Given two access patterns O0 = {a1, a2, . . . , ai} and O1 =
{b1, b2, . . . , bi} and their corresponding write tracesW0 = {w1, w2, . . . , wi}
and W1 = {y1, y2, . . . , yi}, O0 is called indistinguishable from O1 iff. W0
is computationally indistinguishable from W1.
3.2 Defining Plausible Deniability (PD-CPA)
We model PD as a “chosen pattern” security game, PD-CPA 2 for the
block device. Since we focus on mechanisms that “hide” operations to the
hidden volume “within” operations to the public volume, we also define an
implementation-specific parameter establishing the number of operations
that can be hidden within a public operation. Specifically, φ is the ratio
of the number of hidden operations that can be performed with a public
operation such that the write traces due to the public operation with a
hidden operation is indistinguishable from the write traces for the same
operation without the hidden operations. This paper proposes a solution
with φ = 1 to ensure that each public operation performs one hidden
operation.
We define PD-CPA(λ, φ) , with security parameter λ between a chal-
lenger and an adversary as follows:
1. Adversary A provides a storage device D (the adversary can decide
its state fully) to challenger C.
2. C chooses two encryption keys Kpub and Khid using security param-
eter λ and creates two logical volumes, Vpub and Vhid, both stored in
2The similarity with IND-CPA is intentional. The access patterns correspond to the “plain-
texts” in an access pattern privacy setting.
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D. Writes to Vpub and Vhid are encrypted with keys Kpub and Khid
respectively. C also fairly selects a random bit b.
3. C returns Kpub to A.
4. The adversary A and the challenger C then engage in a polynomial
number of rounds in which:
(a) A selects two access patterns O0 and O1 with the following
restriction:
• O1 and O0 include the same writes to Vpub
• Both O1 and O0 may include writes to Vhid
• O0 or O1 should not include more writes to Vhid than φ
times the number of operations to Vpub in that sequence.
(b) C executes Ob on D and sends a snapshot of the device to A.
(c) A outputs b
′
.
(d) A is said to have “won” the round iff. b
′
= b.
We note that the restrictions imposed on the adversary-generated ac-
cess patterns are necessary to eliminate trivially-identifiable cases. E.g.,
allowing different writes to V pub in O0 and O1 would allow the adver-
sary to distinguish between the two sequences by simply decrypting the
contents of V pub (using the known Kpub) and comparing the decrypted
data. Fortunately, a similar comparison is not possible for Vhid since Khid
is not accessible to the adversary.
The restriction imposed by φ ensures that the adversary may not triv-
ially distinguish between O0 and O1 by providing sequences of different
“true lengths” – the number of actual blocks modified in the write trace
generated by a given access pattern. Specifically, for a given φ, PD-CPA
assumes that the true length of a sequence with k writes to V pub is k×φ.
Since, O0 and O1 have the same writes to V pub, their true lengths are the
same. The additional φ writes in the corresponding write traces generated
for the sequences allows hiding writes to V hid. Thus, if the number of
writes to V hid exceed the number allowable by φ, the sequences become
trivially distinguishable by their true lengths.
Relationship with existing work. PD-CPA is similar to the hidden
volume encryption game in [7] with the notable difference that PD-CPA
empowers the adversary further by giving her the ability to choose the
input device. This consideration is regarding a practical scenario where
an oppressive regime officer might be aware of particular underlying prop-
erties of a storage device. Thus, a PD-CPA secure solution should not be
reliant on the properties of a particular kind of storage device that can
be used by the challenger, as that in itself would be suspicious to the
adversary3.
Definition 2. A storage mechanism is “plausibly deniable” if it ensures
that A cannot win any round of the corresponding PD-CPA game with a
3For example, [23] exploits the variations in the programming time of a flash device to hide
data by encoding bits in the programming time of individual cells.
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non-negligible advantage (in the security parameter λ) over random guess-
ing.
3.3 Necessary and sufficient conditions for PD-
CPA
DataLair provides a plausibly deniable solution defeating a PD-CPA ad-
versary. We note informally here (and prove later) that the following
conditions are necessary and sufficient to ensure PD-CPA security.
1. Indistinguishability between hidden data write access patterns (“ac-
cess pattern indistinguishability”, HWA).
2. Indistinguishability between write traces that include public data
accesses with one (or more) hidden data accesses, and the same
public data accesses without any hidden data accesses (“access type
indistinguishability”, PAT).
Indistinguishability between hidden write access patterns (HWA). Re-
call that in PD-CPA, the adversary can include writes to Vhid in both O0
and O1. If the write traces were distinguishable, the two sequences would
become distinguishable to an adversary providing different accesses to Vhid
in the sequences.
Note that HWA indistinguishability also ensures that writes to the
same logical location in Vhid in two different rounds of PD-CPA results
in write traces that are independently distributed and thus prevents an
adversary from “linking” accesses to the same logical location in successive
rounds. In the absence of this “unlinkability”, an adversary could provide
the same accesses to Vhid as part of O1 in successive rounds with only
writes (possibly different) to Vpub as O0. On observing the same write
traces for successive rounds, the adversary could correctly predict that
the sequence executed is O1.
Indistinguishability between public access write traces (PAT). In
PD-CPA, an adversary can provide O0 with only accesses to Vpub and O1
with accesses to both Vpub and Vhid and win trivially if the sequences’
write traces were distinguishable. In effect, to ensure PD-CPA security,
in case O0 and O1 include the same public data operations, they
should be indistinguishable. Note that both sequences should con-
tain the same public data operations since otherwise they are trivially
distinguishable on the basis of any additional public operation that is
performed, as discussed above. This is why the write trace due to a se-
quence of public data operations plus (one or more) hidden data write(s)
should be indistinguishable from the write trace due to accesses including
the same public data operations without any hidden data write(s).
Theorem 1. A storage mechanism is PD-CPA secure iff. it guarantees
indistinguishability between hidden write access patterns (HWA) and in-
distinguishability between public operations with and without hidden writes
(PAT).
Proof. HWA straightforwardly ensures that even if the same logical lo-
cations in Vhid are written by two access patterns in two rounds, their
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write traces are independent. Otherwise, an adversary could win one of
the games by observing the same write traces for the same writes to Vhid
in subsequent rounds.
Also, in absence of PAT, an adversary could win PD-CPA by providing
O0 and O1 with the same public data operations but with and without
writes to Vhid respectively. Thus, PAT is a necessary condition to ensure
PD-CPA security.
We now show that HWA and PAT are also sufficient for PD-CPA. First,
note that HWA ensures that writes to locations in hidden volume Vhid map
to physical locations selected independently of their corresponding logical
locations. Logical and physical locations are uncorrelated. An adversary
cannot determine the logical locations corresponding to observed modified
physical locations.
Second, observe that in the context of the PD-CPA game, PAT ensures
that traces due to combined writes to Vhid and Vpub can be attributed to
writes corresponding to Vpub only. And, as the writes to Vpub are the same
in both the sequences, the adversary cannot distinguish between the write
traces non-negligibly better than guessing.
Now, consider a PD solution, S which provides both HWA and PAT.
Also, consider an adversary A that wins PD-CPA against S selecting two
sequences O0 and O1. Since, O0 and O1 differ only in the writes to Vhid
(writes to Vpub are the same), either of the following holds:
• O0 and O1 contain different writes to Vhid and they are distinguish-
able from the corresponding write traces in direct contradiction to
the HWA property of S.
• O0 contains writes to Vhid and O1 does not contain writes to Vhid,
and the corresponding write traces are distinguishable. This implies
that traces due to combined writes to Vhid and Vpub in O0 are dis-
tinguishable from traces with only the same writes to Vpub in O1, in
direct contradiction to the PAT property of S.
Note that ensuring HWA without PAT and vice versa is not sufficient
for PD-CPA since either of the above two cases will allow the adversary
to win with non-negligible advantage.
4 Access Pattern Indistinguishability
Section 3 shows that one of the necessary conditions to plausibly deny the
existence of a logical volume to a multi-snapshot adversary, is to ensure
indistinguishability of hidden data write access patterns (HWA).
A straightforward solution here is to use an oblivious RAM (ORAM)
which allows a client/CPU to hide its data access patterns from an un-
trusted server/RAM hosting the accessed data. Informally, ORAMs pre-
vent an adversary from distinguishing between equal length sequences of
queries made by a client to the server. This usually also includes indis-
tinguishability between reads and writes. We refer to the vast amount of
existing literature on ORAMs for more formal definitions [10, 22].
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Write-ony ORAM. As noted by Blass et al. [7], an off-the-shelf full
ORAM is simply too powerful since it protects both read and write ac-
cesses – while for PD only write access patterns are of concern. In this
case, a write-only ORAM [7, 12] can be deployed which provides access
pattern privacy against an adversary that can monitor only writes.
Logical vs. practical complexity. ORAM literature traditionally
defines access complexity as the number of logical blocks of data ac-
cessed per I/O. This allows optimizations by using logical blocks of smaller
size [19, 21]. However, it is important to note that standard off-the-shelf
block-based storage devices can access data only in units of physical blocks
(sectors). For example, accessing a 256 byte logical block still entails ac-
cessing the corresponding 4KB block from the disk. Thus, in the con-
text of locally deployed block-based storage devices, practical complexity
needs to be measured in terms of the number of physical blocks (sectors)
accessed per I/O.
HIVE-ORAM. The most bandwidth-efficient write-only ORAM is the
construction by Blass et al. [7] (further referred to as HIVE-ORAM).
HIVE-ORAM [7] maps data from a logical address space uniformly ran-
domly to the physical blocks on the underlying device. The position map
for the ORAM is recursively stored in O(logN) smaller ORAMs, a stan-
dard technique introduced in [19]. The recursive technique reduces the
logical block access complexity for the position map by storing the posi-
tion map blocks in logical blocks of smaller sizes. Under this assumption,
HIVE-ORAM [7] accesses a constant number of logical blocks per ORAM
operation at the cost of some overflow that is stored in an in-memory
stash.
Unfortunately, as noted in [7], with physical blocks of uniform size,
HIVE-ORAM has a practical block read complexity (number of blocks
read) of O(logβN) and a practical block write complexity (number of
blocks written) of O(log2βN) where β = B/2∗addr, B is the physical block
size in bytes and addr is the size of one logical/physical block address in
bytes. This is because to perform a write, HIVE-ORAM [7] needs to
update all logβN position map ORAMs recursively and updating each
ORAM requires O(logβN) accesses to find free blocks. More specifically,
to find free blocks in an ORAM, a constant number of randomly chosen
physical blocks are selected and then the position map for that ORAM is
checked to determine free blocks within the sample. Consequently, with
O(logβN) block read complexity of each position map ORAM, the overall
write complexity of HIVE-ORAM is O(log2βN).
DL-ORAM. We propose DL-ORAM, a new efficient write-only ORAM
scheme with a practical block write complexity of O(logβN). Similar to
[7], DL-ORAM maps blocks from the logical address space to uniformly
random blocks in the physical address space. The DL-ORAM construction
however is significantly different and incorporates two key optimizations.
First, DL-ORAM eliminates the need for recursive position map ORAMs
by storing the position map as a B+ tree, indexed by the logical block
addresses. The tree is stored along with the data within the same ORAM
address space, thus judiciously utilizing space. Second, DL-ORAM uses
a novel O(1) scheme for identifying uniformly random free blocks using
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Figure 1: DL-ORAM. The position map blocks are randomly interleaved with
the data blocks within the same address space.
an auxiliary encrypted data structure. This allows writes with O(logβN)
communication complexity. We detail below.
4.1 Position Map
In DL-ORAM, all blocks are stored encrypted with a semantically secure
cipher. Further, DL-ORAM stores the logical to physical block address
mappings in a B+ tree indexed on the logical data block address. Logical
and physical addresses are assumed to be of the same size. The position
map tree is stored on the device with each node stored in an individual
physical block. Each leaf node stores a sorted list of logical block addresses
along with the corresponding physical block addresses they are mapped
to.
Further, the leaf nodes are ordered from left to right, e.g., the left-
most leaf node contains the entries for logical block addresses in the range
of 1 to β. This ensures that the (i/β)-th leaf node always contains the
mapping for logical block address i. If a logical block is currently not
mapped (e.g. when the block hasn’t been written to yet by the upper
layer), the entry corresponding to that address in the map is set to null.
For traversal, each internal node stores only the list of physical block
address of the nodes children. Note that since the leaves are ordered
on logical addresses, the index within an internal node determines the
child node to visit next in order to retrieve a path corresponding to a
particular logical block address. Searching for a particular logical block
address mapping requires reading all the blocks along a path from the
root to the leaf that contains the mapping for that logical block ID. As
each node is stored in a physical block, the number of block addresses
that can be stored in each leaf node is bound by the physical block size,
β. Consequently, the depth of the tree is bounded by logβ(N) with a
fanout of β. Thus, querying the map for a particular logical to physical
block address mapping requires logβ(N) block accesses.
The position map shares the same physical address space with the
ORAM data blocks. Specifically, the B+ tree blocks are assigned a logical
block address and are written to random physical blocks interleaved with
the data blocks, using the ORAM protocols. The physical location of the
tree root is stored at a known location outside the ORAM address space
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(intuition explained later). Semantic security of the cipher used ensures
that the position map blocks are indistinguishable from the data blocks
in the ORAM.
DL-ORAM supports two operations: read oram and write oram. De-
tailed pseudocode can be found in the Appendix.
read oram(id) returns the data in the block with logical block address
id. It locates the mapping for id in the B+ tree and returns the data
stored in the corresponding physical block.
write oram(id,d) writes data d to the block with logical block address
id. It first determines the entry corresponding to id in the B+ tree and
then writes data d to a new free block. Finally, the map is updated
corresponding to id. The mechanism for finding a free block is described
next in Section 4.2
Finally, updating the map requires recursively writing all the nodes
along the the specific path of the B+ tree to new free blocks to ensure
indistinguishability between map blocks and data blocks. Specifically, the
updated leaf node (after adding the entry for id) is written to a selected
new free block. This results in its parent node being modified and being
mapped to a new free location. Consequently, on an ORAM write, all
the blocks from the root of the map to the corresponding leaf node are
modified and remapped to new locations.
To ensure that the recursion terminates, the physical location of the
tree root is always stored at a known fixed location as described before.
For DL-ORAM , this information is held at a fixed location on the disk
where the physical block address of the root is written encrypted and
is modified for each access. Once the root data is also modified and
remapped to a new physical block, this information is updated.
4.2 Finding Free Blocks
A major challenge for write-only ORAMs is selecting uniformly randomly
free block from the distribution of all free blocks on the device for writ-
ing data. Writing thusly eliminates correlations between the logical data
block addresses and their physical locations, thus rendering an adversary
incapable of linking modifications to physical blocks with the correspond-
ing modifications to logical blocks. Even when data already in the ORAM
needs to be updated, it is relocated to a new random location to prevent
correlation with previous writes.
DL-ORAM deploys a new O(1) scheme for identifying uniformly ran-
dom free blocks using an auxiliary encrypted data structure. This allows
writes with O(logβ(N)) access complexity. This is achieved by storing
free block addresses in a novel encrypted data structure – the free block
matrix (FBM). The FBM is designed with the two following properties –
i) it allows retrieval of uniformly random elements in O(1) accesses, and
ii) it does not reveal the actual number of elements that it contains at any
given point in time. Ensuring (i) allows efficient retrieval of random free
block addresses in our scheme (as we detail later). (ii) ensures that the ac-
tual number of data blocks in the ORAM is not revealed thus preventing
possible correlations.
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Figure 2: FBM design. The FBM is a matrix with β = B/addr rows and N/β
columns, containing N entries. Each entry of the matrix is a physical block ID.
Each column of the FBM is stored in a disk block. A special “FBM header”
array is in stores the number of physical block IDs per row. The FBM requires
N/β + 1 disk blocks for storage – N/β columns and 1 FBM Header. The figure
illustrates an example FBM configuration with 9 entries. The first row has two
invalid entry as indicated by the FBM header.
Free Block Matrix (FBM). The FBM is an encrypted β×N/β matrix
(where N is the total number of physical blocks in the ORAM and β
is number of physical block addresses that can be written to one disk
block) that stores the addresses of all currently free blocks. The columns
of the matrix are stored in consecutive disk blocks outside the ORAM,
each containing β free block addresses (Figure 2). The coordinates in
the matrix where each block address is stored is randomized independent
of the address. Since all blocks are free at initialization, the FBM is
initialized with all N entries containing a randomly chosen disk block
address.
As physical blocks are used for writing data, the corresponding block
addresses need to be removed from the FBM. This is achieved by inval-
idating entries (described next) when the corresponding blocks are used
for ORAM writes. In this case, to track the number of valid entries in
the FBM, the FBM header block stores a block-sized array tracking the
number of valid entries per FBM row.
More specifically, the FBM header contains an entry for each row
indicating the number of valid entries currently present in that row. Since
each row can contain N/β valid entries (corresponding to the number of
columns), each entry in the FBM header is of size log(N/β). For β rows,
the total number of entries in the FBM header is β × log(N/β). Also,
β <= B/logN with B as the block size and each physical address of
length at least equal to logN . Then for β > 1,
β × log(N/β) ≤ β × logN ≤ B/logN × logN ≤ B
Hence, the FBM header always fits in one physical block if B > logN .
With standard 4KB block size on off-the-shelf storage disks, the FBM
header requires more than one block (B < logN) only if the disk has
more than 24096 blocks in total
Figure 2 describes the FBM design.
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Figure 3: Example of FBM with 9 entries. In (a), the FBM header correctly
determines that the 3rd valid entry is at (2,2) since there is 1 valid entry in
the first row and 3 in the second. In (b), the 3rd valid entry is determined
incorrectly since the FBM header correctly indicates that the second row has 2
valid entries but does not show which columns have the valid entries.
Selection from the FBM. The FBM allows selection of uniformly
random block addresses with two disk block accesses as follows – select a
random i in the range of the total number of valid entries in the FBM.
Then, determine the coordinate of the ith entry in the FBM by counting
valid entries row-wise – this is straightforward since the header stores the
number of valid entries per row. The block address at that coordinate is
then retrieved from the corresponding location.
If the block is subsequently used (possibly for a new write), it is in-
validated by reducing the valid entry count for the corresponding row in
the FBM header. Consequently, for subsequent accesses the FBM header
indicates that the row has one less valid entry. Note that invalidating an
entry does not entail removing it from the disk block storing the FBM
column, rather the FBM header is updated to ensure that the entry is not
used in subsequent accesses.
An important condition for correctness of this mechanism is to en-
sure that a location determined from the FBM header always contains a
valid entry. A possible scenario where this might be violated is shown in
Figure 3 where the FBM incorrectly points to a location that contains
an invalid entry. The problem in this case is due the presence of invalid
entries between valid entries (as in Figure 3(b)). Here, the FBM header
correctly indicates that the second row has 2 valid entries but does not
indicate the columns with the valid entries. Determining the exact co-
ordinate at which the valid entry is present is non-trivial given that the
header only records the number of valid entries in a row but not their
corresponding locations. Consequently, with gaps between valid entries in
the FBM (as in Figure 3), the selection mechanism described above can
erroneously return block addresses (corresponding to invalid entries) that
are already being used.
Compacting the FBM. To ensure correctness, DL-ORAM maintains
the following invariant – all invalid entries in the FBM appear before all
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Figure 4: Compacting the FBM. Invalid entries appear before valid entries when
entries are traversed row-wise. In the example, 7 was selected randomly from
(2,3) which was replaced by 5 from (1,2) to ensure compactness.
valid entries when the FBM is traversed row-wise. This requires all valid
entries in a particular row to be invalidated first before invalidating an
entry from the next row in sequence – e.g., all entries in the first row are
invalidated before the second row etc. Since, entries are selected randomly
from the FBM, DL-ORAM performs an extra compaction step to maintain
the invariant.
The compaction replaces a randomly selected valid entry from the FBM
by another valid entry which is selected row-wise from the FBM. This re-
placement entry is the first valid entry that is encountered while counting
valid entries per row sequentially from the FBM header. After the re-
placement, the FBM header is updated.
For example, in Figure 4, 7 is uniformly randomly selected (and in-
validated) from coordinate (2,3) in the FBM using the protocol described
above. This leads to a configuration that violates the invariant. Then for
compaction, 5 is copied from coordinate (1,2) to (2,3) and the entry at
(1,2) is invalidated. Note that the entry at (1,2) is the first valid entry
encountered while traversing the FBM row-wise. Also, even though the
FBM now contains duplicate block addresses at (1,2) and (2,3), the block
address at (1,2) will not be used subsequently during uniform selection
since the FBM header correctly indicates that row 1 has one valid entry.
Due the invariant, this single valid entry has to be present at (1,3).
Compaction straightforwardly ensures the invariant since randomly
selected entries are replaced by entries that are selected row-wise and
subsequently invalidated. To summarize, the compaction modifies two
blocks – the header and the block from which the random entry is selected
and replaced.
Moreover, in certain cases this compaction is not required. For in-
stance, when a free block address is to be added to the FBM and a new
random free block address is required in turn. Recall that this is indeed
the case for updates to DL-ORAM blocks – the updated data is written
to a new free block while the block containing the previous data is now
free and the corresponding free block address can be added back to the
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FBM. In this case, the new randomly chosen free block address can be
directly replaced by the free block address that is to be added back to the
FBM. Note that due to the direct replacement, the header does not need
to be updated.
In order to ensure that such an access looks indistinguishable from
an access with compaction – otherwise an adversary could identify ac-
cesses which are simply updates to existing blocks and thus deduce the
actual number of data blocks in the ORAM – the FBM header is reen-
crypted along with the modification to the block where the replacement
takes place. Due to semantic security, reencrytion of the header is indis-
tinguishable from actual modification during compaction.
Finally, note that entries are added back to the FBM only as part of
updates (as described above). DL-ORAM does not support deletes since
modern filesystems do not indicate deletes to block devices. Specifically,
FS such as ext4 only update its internal metadata to track blocks that
have been deleted while the deleted data is overwritten only when the
block is subsequently allocated for writing new data. Thus, when DL-
ORAM is used with an overlying filesystem mounted logical volume (the
deployment scenario considered here), deletes are logically equivalent to
updates and the deleted data is updated with new data in future accesses.
Uniform free block selection As discussed, the FBM provides an effi-
cient mechanism for determining uniformly random free block addresses
for ORAM writes with O(1) access complexity. Unfortunately, writing
to blocks only selected from the FBM for every write, can result in cer-
tain blocks in the ORAM never being modified. For instance, consider a
block containing data that is never updated. This block is never subse-
quently modified in the ORAM after the first write since the block never
becomes free again. This can leak subtle correlations since an adversary
can differentiate between disk blocks that are being updated frequently
from locations that are not updated since they were first written.
To solve this, DL-ORAM deploys an O(1) free block selection scheme
using the FBM, that modifies uniformly random locations in the ORAM
and thus prevents any block level correlations. The intuition is to always
modify k (a chosen constant) random disk blocks while also finding a free
block.
For every ORAM write, DL-ORAM creates two sets, each with k items
as follows –
1. A free set that contains k randomly chosen free block addresses from
the FBM.
2. A random set that contains k randomly chosen block addresses out
of all the blocks in the ORAM.
In case of duplicate items between the sets, one of the duplicates is
randomly discarded while a new item is selected either to the free set or
the combined set depending on the set from which the item was discarded.
Then, items from the two sets are merged randomly to create a combined
set.
Selection Protocol. Using the combined set DL-ORAM , executes the
following protocol –
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1. Select an item randomly from the combined set.
2. If the item, i selected in step 1 originally belonged to the free set, use
the corresponding block for the ORAM write. Otherwise, reencrypt
the block corresponding to the block address selected. Remove the
item from the combined set.
3. Repeat steps 1-3, k times.
4. For all the remaining items, i, that are also in the free set, replace
the addresses back in the FBM from where they were selected.
Lemma 1. The sample of k physical blocks modified for every ORAM
write (due to the selection protocol) is indistinguishable from a sample of
k blocks selected uniformly at random out of the N physical blocks in the
ORAM.
Proof. The idea here is to show that the probability of a block x being
selected (and modified) randomly in a sample of k blocks out of N , is
the same as the probability of x being one of the k blocks chosen by the
selection protocol. Let X denote the event of x being chosen uniformly
at random in a sample of k blocks out of N . Then, straightforwardly
Pr[X] = k/N .
Next, consider the process of building the free set. Let Pr[x ∈ FBM ]
denote the probability that x is currently in the FBM. Since the FBM
is initialized with all N block addresses and for each access, entries are
selected (and invalidated) uniformly randomly, all N block addresses are
equally likely to be present and valid in the FBM during the current
access. More specifically, all the N initial entries are equally likely to
have been invalidated in the writes that have preceded this access. Thus,
Pr[x ∈ FBM ] = f/N when f is the current number of valid entries in
the FBM.
Let E1 be the event that x is selected into the free set – x is one
of k randomly chosen block addresses selected from the FBM to form
the free set. This conditionally depends on x being present in the FBM.
Thus, Pr[E1] = Pr[x ∈ k|x ∈ FBM ] = Pr[x ∈ k] × Pr[x ∈ FBM ] =
k/f × f/N = k/N since the event that x is selected as one of the k items
from the FBM is independent of x being present in the FBM.
Now, since the random set is created by selecting k random block
address out of all N , the event that x is selected into the random set, E2
straightforwardly has the probability, Pr[E2] = k/N . Thus, x has equal
probability of being added to the combined set from either the free set or
the random set. Note that the combined set has size 2k.
LetX
′
be the event of x being selected for modification by the protocol.
The goal here is to show Pr[X] = Pr[X
′
]. X
′
depends on x being chosen
either to free set or the random set (E1 and E2) and x being selected in
one of the rounds of the protocol, denoted by event Y . Thus, Pr[X ′] =
Pr[Y ]× Pr[E1UE2].
Let Y = Y1 + Y2 + . . . + Yk where Yi is the event that x is selected
in the ith round of the protocol. Also, since x can be selected only once
(selection without replacement), probability of x being selected in the ith
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round conditionally depends on x not being selected in previous rounds4.
Then,
Pr[Y = Yi] = Pr[Yi|Y 6= Yi−1, Yi−2, . . . , Y1]
Note that for round i, an item is selected from the combined set with
probability 1/(2k− i) since previously selected items are removed without
replacement.
Now, Pr[Y = Y1] = 1/2k.
Pr[Y = Y2] = Pr[Y2|Y 6= Y1] = 1/(2k − 1)× Pr[Y 6= Y1] = 1/2k.
It can be similarly shown that Pr[Y = Yi] = 1/2k ∀i ∈ k. Thus,
Pr[Y ] =
i=k∑
i=1
Pr[Y = Yi] = 1/2.
Finally, Pr[X
′
] = Pr[Y ] × Pr[E1UE2] = 1/2 × 2k/N = k/N , thus
proving Pr[X
′
] = Pr[X].
Stash. If none of the k rounds yields a free block, the data is written
to an in-memory stash. Since, initially there are equal number of items
from the free set and the random set in the combined set and uniformly
random items are selected each round, k rounds of the protocol yields an
expected k/2 number of items from the free set. If k = 3, the DL-ORAM
stash can be modeled as a D/M/1 queue similar to [7], and bound to a
constant size with negligible failure probability in the security parameter.
We refer to [7] for details.
Device utilization. A final detail is to ensure that the expected number
of free blocks obtained from the selection protocol does not exceed the ex-
pected number of free blocks obtained from an equal-sized sample selected
randomly out of all the blocks in the ORAM. Otherwise, the protocol will
always yield an expected k/2 free blocks unlike a randomly selected sam-
ple where the expected number of free blocks will be a function of the
actual distribution of data. Note that lemma 1 shows indistinguishability
between a randomly selected sample and the sample obtained due to the
modification in Step 2 of the protocol for each write. However, a signif-
icant difference in the expected number of free blocks obtained can leak
subtle correlations over multiple rounds. Fortunately, a straightforward
solution for this is to ensure that half of the ORAM blocks are always
free. Note that a similar assumption is also made by HIVE [7] but for
a different purpose, namely to bound the in-memory stash for the write
protocol.
Lemma 2. If half of the ORAM blocks are always ensured to be free, the
expected number of free blocks provided by the selection protocol per write
is equivalent to the expected number of free blocks in a sample of k blocks
randomly selected out of all N blocks in the ORAM.
4Y follows a hypergeometric distribution with 2k population size, k draws and 1 observed
and possible success state. Thus, the following could also be derived straightforwardly using
the probability mass function for the distribution.
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Figure 5: Free block selection. The free block selection described in (a) is biased
towards selecting more free blocks into the combined set since the set of free
blocks is a subset of all blocks on the disk, which in turn is used for selection into
the random set. A non-biased selection mechanism (b) selects equal number of
block out of the occupied blocks and the free blocks into the combined set. The
set of occupied blocks and free blocks are disjoint by construction.
Proof. Note that a free block can be obtained by the protocol only if an
item is selected from the free set in Step 1, for at least 1 out of the k
rounds. Since, the rounds are independent, it can be straightforwardly
observed that the expected number of free blocks yielded by the selection
protocol is k/2. This is equal to the expected number of free blocks in a
randomly selected sample of k blocks, if half of the blocks in the ORAM
are always free.
Access Complexity. Both read oram() and write oram() access the
ORAM map to locate the target block. The complexity of accessing an
entry in the B+ tree is O(logβN). Further, write oram() needs to find
and write to O(logβN) free blocks for writing data and updating the map
blocks. Finding a free block requires O(1) accesses as discussed above,
and thus the write complexity of DL-ORAM is O(logβN). Consequently,
the overall access complexity of DL-ORAM is O(B × logβ(N)).
4.3 Security Over Multiple Rounds
As per a recent email conversation with Roche et al. [26], an adversary can
mount an attack on DL-ORAM over multiple rounds of execution based
on the observation that the free block selection mechanism described in
Section 4.2 is slightly biased towards selection of free blocks (Figure 5(a)).
In particular, the set of all free blocks is a subset of all blocks on the
disk. Since, an equal number of elements is selected into the combined
set from the free set (sampled uniformly out of the set of free blocks)
and the random set (sampled uniformly out of all blocks on the disk),
a free block is more likely to be selected into the combined set than an
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occupied block. In fact, the adversary’s advantage in guessing whether a
block is free or occupied, over multiple rounds of observation is O(1/N),
which is non-negligible in the security parameter. However, note that for
practical purposes, 1/N = O(2−30) is still significantly small for large
storage devices.
In order to mitigate this security leak, we propose a new selection pro-
tocol (Figure 5(b)), ensuring that all blocks are equally likely to be in the
combined set, irrespective of their state of occupancy. More specifically,
the combined set is now formed with equal number of elements uniformly
sampled from the set of all free blocks and the set of all occupied blocks.
Note that these sets are disjoint and are of equal size when the disk is
full – since DL-ORAM allows only half of the block to be occupied at any
given time. Because the sets are disjoint, all blocks are equally likely to
be selected to the combined set from the set of free blocks or the set of
occupied blocks.
Initialization. For this mechanism to work, the set of free blocks and
the set of occupied blocks should always be of equal size. This can be
easily achieved by running an initialization phase where half of the disk
is written with random data. In this case, all future accesses to the disk
will be substitutions of the logical blocks written during the initialization
since DL-ORAM allows only half of the disk to be occupied. Note that an
initialization step is a standard assumption for ORAM protocols which
assume that logical data (possibly random) is loaded into the ORAM to
setup an initial configuration of associated data structures (such as the
position map etc. [21]).
Deploying the new selection mechanism requires several changes to the
scheme as we need to maintain the block addresses of all occupied blocks
efficiently. This is achieved using a non-free block matrix (N-FBM), a
structure similar to the FBM.
Non- Free Block Matrix (N-FBM). As discussed, the N-FBM is
used to store block addresses of all currently occupied blocks at random
locations. The N-FBM is an encrypted β ×N/β matrix (where N is the
total number of physical blocks in the ORAM and β is number of physi-
cal block addresses that can be written to one disk block). The columns
of the matrix are stored in consecutive disk blocks outside the ORAM,
each containing β free block addresses (Figure 2). The coordinates in the
matrix where each block address is stored is randomized independent of
the address. Contrary to the FBM, the N-FBM is empty at initializa-
tion. During the initialization step described above, the block addresses
corresponding to the physical blocks being written are added to random
locations in the N-FBM. Thus, after the initialization step, the N-FBM
contains block addresses of all currently occupied blocks at N/2 random
locations.
Adding addresses to the N-FBM . The challenge is to keep obliv-
ious update the N-FBM, i.e. addresses corresponding to physical blocks
used for writes after the initialization need to be added to the N-FBM
securely. A naive solution of adding block addresses to deterministic lo-
cations in the N-FBM will allow the adversary to link these modifications
and thus violate security. Consequently, block addresses have to be added
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Figure 6: The FBM and the N-FBM synchronization. On a logical write to
block b originally located at physical block x on disk, a new free block y is first
selected from the FBM. y is replaced with x in the FBM followed by update
to the position map (PM). The PM entry for b is updated with location where
y is added to the N-FBM. Additionally, the PM entry for b before this access
contained the location where x was added in the N-FBM previously. Once x is
added back to the FBM, its previous location in the N-FBM is marked as free
in the bitmap to indicate a duplicate entry.
to random locations thus generating random write traces to the N-FBM.
Fortunately, only N/2 locations in the N-FBM can contain valid phys-
ical block addresses of currently occupied blocks since only N/2 physical
blocks out of all N blocks on the disk can be occupied at any given time.
The rest of the N/2 locations in the N-FBM are “free” and new block
addresses can be added there. Consequently, a randomly selected loca-
tion from the N-FBM will be free with probability 1/2. DL-ORAM tracks
the locations in the N-FBM that do not contain valid block addresses of
currently occupied blocks using a bitmap (assumed to be in memory, later
we show how to store on disk). More specifically, the bitmap tracks the
locations in the N-FBM that are currently free.
Then, to find a free location in the N-FBM, a location is randomly
selected and its corresponding bitmap entry is checked to determine its
state of occupancy. In case, the location selected is not free, a new random
location is selected and the process is repeated until a free location is
obtained. With security parameter, λ, the probability that a free location
is not obtained even after repeating the process λ times is O(2−λ), which is
negligible in λ. We however note that this process is expensive and show
how to perform this efficiently after describing our free block selection
protocol.
Handling duplicates. An obvious problem to adding block addresses
to random free locations is that the N-FBM soon fills up with duplicate
entries. Consider the following scenario where logical block b is stored at
physical block y. When b is updated by a future access, it is moved to a
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new physical block x (selected from the FBM) while y is now free and can
thus be added back to the FBM (Section 4.2). Additionally, x is added to
a random location in the N-FBM. Note that although y is free, an entry
for y still exists in the N-FBM as it must have been added on the previous
access to b! This results in duplicate entries in the FBM and the N-FBM
which breaks the assumption that the two sets are disjoint.
In order to rectify this, DL-ORAM updates the N-FBM bitmap ac-
cordingly to indicate that the location previously occupied by y is now
free. DL-ORAM keeps track of this location using the position map. More
specifically, when y is added to the N-FBM, as part of a write to b, DL-
ORAM additionally stores the location where y is added to the N-FBM in
the position map entry for b. Subsequently, when y is freed (next access
to b), DL-ORAM updates the bitmap to indicate that the corresponding
location in the N-FBM is free.
Figure 6 describes the mechanism of adding blocks to the FBM and
the N-FBM during free block selection.
Free Block Selection. The new free block selection protocol (Figure
5 (b)) can be implemented straightforwardly using the FBM as the set of
free block addresses and the N-FBM as the set of occupied block addresses
as follows –
Creates two sets, each with k items as follows –
1. A free set that contains k randomly chosen free block addresses from
the FBM.
2. A occupied set that contains k randomly chosen block address from
the N-FBM .
Combine the two sets into a combined set. Note that since the two
sets are disjoint, there are no duplicates in the combined set.
1. Select an item randomly from the combined set.
2. For the item, i selected in step 1 –
(a) If i originally belonged to the free set, use the corresponding
block for the ORAM write and update the FBM and N-FBM.
(b) If i is from the occupied set, reencrypt the block corresponding
to the address and reencrypt an additional random location
from the N-FBM.
Remove i from the combined set.
3. Repeat steps 1-3, k times.
4. For all the remaining items, i, that are also in the free set, replace
the addresses back in the FBM from where they were selected.
Lemma 3. The sample of k physical blocks modified for every ORAM
write (due to the selection protocol) is indistinguishable from a sample of
k blocks selected uniformly at random out of the N physical blocks in the
ORAM.
Proof. First, note that for a block x that is currently, the probability
of being selected to the combined set is Pr[x ∈ combined|x ∈ free] =
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1/2×k/(N/2) = k/N , i.e. probability that x is selected into the combined
set depends on the probability that x is free (=1/2 since at any given
time N/2 random blocks are free out of all N blocks on the disk) and
that x is one of k selected block addresses from the FBM. Similarly, the
probability of x being selected to the combined set if x is occupied is
Pr[x ∈ combined|x ∈ occupied] = 1/2 × k/(N/2) = k/N . Thus, Pr[x ∈
combined] = 2k/N . Now, if x is in the combined set, the probability that
x will be one of the k items selected randomly out of the 2k items in the
combined set is Pr[x ∈ k|x ∈ combined] = 1/2 × 2k/N = k/N . This is
equal to the probability, P [x ∈ random] = k/N of x being a part of any
random sample of k blocks selected uniformly out of all N disk blocks.
Selecting free locations in the N-FBM. Bounding the stash size.
As discussed before after a logical block has been written to a physical
block, the physical block address needs to be added to a random location
in the N-FBM that does not contain a valid block address of a currently
occupied block – that is a free location. To achieve this, random locations
from the N-FBM are selected until a free location is obtained to write the
block address. Unfortunately, this is an expensive process
An alternative solution is to write the logical block to the in-memory
stash when randomly selecting a location from the N-FBM does not yield
a free location to write the corresponding physical block address. For
example, when a logical block b is to be updated, and the free block
selection protocol provides physical block y to perform the write, DL-
ORAM randomly selects a location from the N-FBM. If the location is
free (as determined by the bitmap), b is written to y, and y is written
to the selected location in the N-FBM. On the other had, if the location
selected from the N-FBM is not free, b is written to the stash and y is
added back to its original location in the FBM. Further, the block address
already stored at the N-FBM location selected is reencrypted. In effect,
there is no change to the state of the FBM or the N-FBM.
However, in this case, the logical block stash size needs to be bounded
under the new constraints. Note that now the probability that each block
write succeeds depends on two conditions – the probability that the ran-
dom free block selection protocol yields a free block in round i < k of the
protocol (= 1/2) and the probability that a randomly selected location
from the N-FBM is free (=1/2). Thus, the probabilty with which a block
is successfully written to the disk in one round of the selection protocol
is 1/4. Then, to bound the stash, the value of k needs to be modified
such that the rate parameter of the D/M/1 queue (on which the stash is
modelled), µ = k/4 > 1. This ensures that the stash size is bounded to a
constant size with failure probability negligible in the security parameter
[7]. DL-ORAM sets k = 5.
Storing the bitmap. A final detail is to securely store the bitmap.
Since, large DRAMs are ubiquitous in modern systems, the bitmap could
be stored entirely in memory and thus does not need to be subject to the
ORAM protocols. For example, for a 1TB storage device, 32MB of mem-
ory is enough to hold the bitmap. Nonetheless, for large storage devices
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it may be desirable to store the bitmap on the disk to ensure consistency
accross failures. Note that if the bitmap is stored on disk, it also needs
to be subject to the ORAM protocols to ensure that the adversary can-
not link accesses based on the bitmap updates. More specifically, when a
part of the bitmap is updated, it needs to be relocated to a new random
location.
The bitmap is stored in multiple random disk blocks while an array
(“bitmap position array”) in memory tracks the location of the disk blocks
storing a part of the bitmap. The “bitmap position array” is significantly
smaller in size than the DL-ORAM stash. For example with 4KB physical
block size, the number of disk blocks required to store the bitmap for
a 1TB device is 213. With the bitmap position array storing a 8 byte
physical block address for each such disk block, the total size of the array
is 64KB. Storing the bitmap thusly ensures that accessing the bitmap
requires only 1 disk access.
Asymptotic Complexity. The new free block selection protocol and
the addition of the N-FBM and the bitmap does not change the asymptotic
complexity from Section 4.2. First, selecting a non-duplicate block address
from the N-FBM to the occupied set requires only a constant number of
accesses within which at least one expected non-duplicate block address in
the N-FBM will be found. If the bitmap is stored in-memory, the accesses
are free. Even when the bitmap is stored on disk, accesses to a part of the
bitmap can be performed with 1 disk access as described before. The FBM
requires constant number of accesses for adding/selecting items. Thus,
the free block selection presented here can be performed with O(1) access
complexity and the ORAM write complexity is dominated by the update
to the position map – DL-ORAM write complexity is still O(logβN)
Theorem 2. DL-ORAM provides write access pattern indistinguishabil-
ity.
Proof. To show write access pattern indistinguishability, we show the ex-
istance of a simulator that can generate a write trace indistinguishable
from the write trace generated by any DL-ORAM write, without any
knowledge of the block being written or of the data stored in the ORAM,
based only on public information.
First, note that each ORAM write (including updates to the position
map) invariably generates the following write trace –
1. Modify k unique disk blocks.
2. Modify k locations in the FBM.
3. Modify k locations in the N-FBM.
4. Modify 2× k bitmap locations (if stored on disk).
Now a simulator, S can generate a write trace indistinguishable from
the write trace described above as follow –
1. Reencrypt k random disk blocks. As shown by Lemma 3, the k blocks
modified by the write are indistinguishable from k blocks selected
randomly out of all N blocks.
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Figure 7: Design of DataLair Lite. Writes to the hidden partition happen
through DL-ORAM.
2. Reencrypt k random locations from the FBM. Due to uniformly
random selection of entries from the FBM, this is indistinguishable
from a real FBM access.
3. Reencrypt k random locations in the N-FBM. Due to all entries in
the N-FBM being at uniformly random locations, this is indistin-
guishable from a real N-FBM access.
4. Reencrypt 2 × k random bitmap locations. As random locations in
the N-FBM are modified (due to Step 3), this is indistinguishable
from a real modification to the bitmap.
Semantic security of the encryption scheme ensures that reencrytion
is indistinguishable from a real modification. Finally, each access results
in writes to blocks of the position map along with the block that the
user wants to access. Position map and data blocks are re-encrypted with
semantic security and thus indistinguishable.
Simulating a write. Theorem 2 shows that a write oram write trace
can be generated without any knowledge of the write being performed or
the data stored in the ORAM. Consequently, a write oram access can
be simulated even with random data stored in the ORAM and the auxil-
iary data structures (FBM, N-FBM, bitmap etc.). We use this property
of DL-ORAM as a basis for the solution described in Section 5. Due to
semantic security, re-randomizing blocks with random data is indistin-
guishable from reencrypting a block with valid data.
5 Access Type Indistinguishability
We now detail the design of DataLair, which ensures HWA by deploying
DL-ORAM (Section 4) and PAT through its access protocols described
below. For PAT, DataLair ensures that a device containing both public
and hidden data is indistinguishable from a device containing only public
data.
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First, we describe a simple secure design, DataLair Lite, which sacri-
fices storage space for reduced design complexity. Section 5.2, introduces
a more complex but space-efficient design dubbed DataLair Full.
5.1 DataLair Lite: Isolating Volumes
Setup. DataLair Lite maps blocks from two logical volumes to an un-
derlying block device and can be set up in two modes of operation –
ONLY PUB (only public) and PUB HID (public and hidden). In the
ONLY PUB mode, the device only stores data from a “public” logical
volume that is disclosed to an adversary. For PUB HID mode, Data-
Lair Lite also stores data from a hidden volume. DataLair Lite fixes the
size of each volume to 50% of the underlying physical device size. Each
logical volume may support a filesystem. DataLair Lite creates two phys-
ical partitions on the device – a public partition and a hidden partition,
according to the corresponding logical volume sizes (Figure 7). When,
DataLair Lite is initialized in ONLY PUB mode, the hidden partition is
filled with random data.
The underlying storage is a block device with N blocks of size B each
and physical block address Pid ∈ [1, N ]. The format of the address would
vary across different types of block devices, e.g., in case of a hard disk,
the physical block address would be the sector numbers that constitute
one block on the physical device.
Logical block addresses Vid ∈ [1, |Vid|] are used to reference blocks in
the logical volumes (|Vid| is the size of the volume). The logical blocks
are mapped to the physical blocks using a device mapper. Data from
the public volume is mapped to the public partition directly (as indicated
by the overlying FS) while data from the hidden volume is mapped to
the hidden partition using DL-ORAM. In addition, semantically secure
encryption is used to encrypt all data and metadata before writing. Public
data is encrypted with a key Kpub available to the adversary. Hidden data
is encrypted with secret key Khid. In practice, keys may be derived from
user passwords.
I/O. DataLair Lite maps logical volume I/O into either public or hidden
volume operations.
Public reads and writes are straightforward since DataLair Lite can
linearly translate the logical block address and perform a read/write to the
corresponding physical block in the public partition. A read to the hidden
volume calls read oram on the hidden partition. In addition, to ensure
PD, with every public write, DataLair Lite performs a hidden operation
as follows:
• If there is a write queued up for the hidden logical volume, it is
performed by calling write oram.
• In the absence of a write for the hidden volume, or if DataLair Lite
is used in ONLY PUB mode, a write is simulated for DL-ORAM
(as described in Section 4).
Effectively, this ensures that every write to the hidden volume is pre-
ceded by a write to the public volume. If there is no public write when a
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hidden write request arrives at DataLair Lite, the hidden data is queued
in the DL-ORAM stash. With every write to the public volume, either an
outstanding write (or data from the stash) is written to the hidden vol-
ume (using DL-ORAM) or a write is simulated. As shown before, these
two cases are indistinguishable to an adversary without the key for DL-
ORAM.
Security. The construction described above provides PD for the hidden
volume. First, both the ONLY PUB and PUB HID modes of opera-
tions create public and hidden partitions of equal size. A write to the
public volume in both the cases results in indistinguishable modifications
to the hidden partition – either due to an actual write or a simulation.
This guarantees PAT indistinguishability. Further, deploying DL-ORAM
on the hidden partition ensures HWA indistinguishability. Recall that
these are the necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure PD-CPA secu-
rity.
5.2 DataLair Full: Merging Volumes
Although, DataLair Lite (Section 5.1) achieves PD, it makes sub-optimal
use of storage space – e.g., in ONLY PUB mode, a hidden partition
uses up 50% of the space allocated to it, notwithstanding of actual use.
A more reasonable solution would allow physical volume storage space to
correspond to logical use requirements. Further, space not used for hidden
data should be available for public data and vice-versa.
To this end, DataLair Full allows the user to create two (or more)
volumes of variable sizes and stores them on the same physical partition.
In this case, both the public and the hidden volume can be of the same
logical size as the underlying partition and use all the available space (in
this case up to 50% of total device size) for either hidden or public data.
We provide the intuition for the restricted device usage further below.
Unfortunately, achieving this is significantly more challenging than
the Lite construction – the main problem being mapping public data to
independent locations in the presence of hidden data. We detail below.
Mapping Public Data. First, with both public and hidden data be-
ing stored within the same physical address space, writing public data
straightforwardly to physical blocks indicated by an overlying filesystem
is not possible. Since DataLair does not restrict the choice of filesys-
tem, the distribution of public data will also determine the distribution of
hidden data. For example, with a log structured filesystem on the public
volume, all hidden data will end up being “pushed” towards the end of the
disk. This breaks the security of the random free block selection mecha-
nism in DL-ORAM. Instead, public data will need to be mapped randomly
without compromising overall PD. This requires storing a corresponding
mapping table for the public volume .
Public Position Map (PPM). DataLair Full stores the logical to
physical block address mappings for public data in an array called the
Public Position Map (PPM), stored at a fixed device location. The PPM
is similar to the mapping table used by most device mappers. Importantly,
the PPM is considered to be public data and thus not subject to PD.
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To proceed, it is necessary to define two important terms here to cat-
egorize physical blocks on the basis of their state of occupancy: truly free
and apparently free. Truly free block: a block that does not contain
any (public or hidden) data. Apparently free block: a block that
contains hidden data and the use of which needs to be hidden from an
adversary, i.e., the block needs to “appear” free to an adversary.
To maintain PD, public data writes should not avoid apparently free
blocks by writing around hidden data. Thus, while writing public data
to randomly selected blocks, DataLair must ensure that all free blocks
(including truly free and apparently free) are equally likely to get selected
to complete the write. An obvious solution then is to choose a random
block and write the public data there if it is unoccupied. If the block is
apparently free, the hidden data there can be relocated to a new random
location subsequently.
This approach however creates a significant problem. Recall that DL-
ORAM writes hidden data by deploying the uniform free block selection
protocol (detailed in Section 4.2), using the FBM for selecting “free” block
addresses. In the current context, to ensure correctness, the FBM should
contain addresses of only truly free blocks, i.e., blocks that do not contain
either public or hidden data. Thus, randomly choosing a block for writing
public data will also require the corresponding block address to be invali-
dated in the FBM. Otherwise, the FBM will contain block addresses that
are already occupied by public data. If such a block address is selected
for a subsequent hidden write, the public data in the block will have to
be moved elsewhere (leaking the presence of hidden data) to complete
the write. Unfortunately, invalidating a particular randomly chosen block
address in the FBM is not straightforward – by construction the location
of a block address in the FBM is randomized.
The solution then is to select block addresses for public writes also
from the FBM while updating the FBM in the process. The problem
however with naively implementing this is that the FBM is hidden data
i.e, the FBM is encrypted with the DL-ORAM secret key. Thus, using the
FBM for public writes would entail the user to provide the FBM key to
the adversary since all public operations and data structures in DataLair
needs to be transparent to the adversary for PD. Providing the FBM key
to the adversary breaks the security of DL-ORAM if hidden data is also
stored.
Public Free List (PFL). To solve this, DataLair selects free block
addresses from the FBM but also provides a way to plausibly deny this.
The idea is to store a public (encrypted with the public key) list of block
addresses corresponding to the blocks that do not contain public data.
The list further supports the following two properties: i) it allows efficient
retrieval of uniformly random entries, and ii) the location of any given
entry in the list can be determined efficiently. We detail below.
The PFL (Figure 8 ) is a data structure keeping track of block ad-
dresses of blocks that do not contain public data. The PFL is public (not
subject to deniability) and is composed of two arrays:
1. The forward mapping array (FMA) (size N) of block addresses that
currently do not contain public data (apparently free + truly free).
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Figure 8: Sample PFL with 7 entries. Each entry in the FMA is a physical
block address. The reverse mapping array (RMA) stores an index pointer to
the forward mapping array (FMA) for a particular entry.
Uniformly random block addresses can be selected by picking up the
entry at a randomly selected index in the array. If the selected entry
is to be removed from the PFL (use case described later), the array is
subsequently compacted, by moving the entry at the end of the array
to the index corresponding to the removed item. The compacting
ensures that the real size of the array is always known and entries
can be picked uniformly.
2. The reverse mapping array (RMA) (size N) tracks the index in the
forward mapping array corresponding to each physical block address.
Whenever an entry is removed/added or replaced in the forward
mapping array, the reverse mapping array is updated as well.
The intuition behind the PFL is that the FMA allows DataLair to effi-
ciently select and retrieve a free block address that does not contain public
data, while the RMA allows efficiently locating the index of a particular
free block address in the forward mapping array.
Public write free block selection. DataLair Full performs the public
write free block selection as follows. First, the uniform free block selection
protocol using the FBM is deployed as described in Section 4.2. More
specifically, for a public write, DataLair Full creates a free set and the
random set. In addition, now the random set can be built by using random
block addresses from the PFL because the blocks that already contain
public data (and thus not part of the PFL) can be trivially excluded
as being occupied. This is followed by executing the k rounds of the
protocol using the combined set. If the protocol yields a free block address
then the data is written to that block. Then, using the RMA, DataLair
Full determines the location of the block address in the FMA, which is
subsequently removed. This allows DataLair Full to claim that the block
address was actually selected from the PFL.
If the protocol yields no free blocks, the data is still written to the disk
(instead of being added to the in-memory stash). The idea here is to en-
sure that a public write always translates to a write to the disk. Since the
modifications to blocks not containing public data (due to a hidden write
or DL-ORAM simulation) are attributed to public data writes, writing
public data to the stash can result in inconsistent modifications on the
disk and violate PD.
28
To implement this, when the selection protocol does not yield a truly
free block for a public write, the public data is instead written to an ap-
parently free block. The hidden data there can then be moved to the
stash and written back in a subsequent hidden write. An apparently free
block address can be straightforwardly selected from the DL-ORAM posi-
tion map, which as described before stores the logical to physical address
mappings for data in the ORAM (hidden data in this case). Subsequently,
this block address is removed from the PFL. Note that the PFL necessarily
contains this address, since it contains entries of all blocks not containing
public data – which also includes blocks that already contain hidden data
(apparently free blocks). Thus, a free block address selected using this
procedure can also be attributed to being selected from the PFL
Hidden write free block selection. Hidden writes follow the same
procedure as DataLair Lite by invoking the DL-ORAM write protocol.
However unlike public writes, hidden data is still written to the stash
if the selection protocol yields no free blocks. Recall that one of the
requirements for a bounded DL-ORAM stash is to ensure that half of the
ORAM is free. In this case, since DL-ORAMwill write to the blocks which
are shared with public data, it necessary to ensure that the combined size
of public and hidden data is only half the size of the device. This is
achieved by the DataLair device mapper only allowing the user to create
logical volumes with size equal to or less than half of the device capacity.
Further, on reaching 50% utilization, the device mapper informs the user
that the disk is full.
Indistinguishability between two modes of operation. Recall
that in the ONLY PUB mode, DL-ORAM and the FBM is initialized
with random data. Thus, the free block selection mechanism for public
data writes described above (using the FBM) cannot be deployed in this
case. Fortunately, to overcome this the PFL can be used to efficiently
select uniformly random free block addresses. Once the address has been
selected and removed from the FMA, the array is compacted.
Further, to ensure indistinguishability, the accesses due to the uni-
form free block selection using the FBM is simulated by reencrypting the
required number of FBM blocks and required number of random block
addresses selected from the PFL.
In summary (Figure 9), when writing public data in ONLY PUB
mode, a randomly chosen block address is removed from the PFL while
simulating the uniform free block selection protocol. In PUB HID mode,
the randomly chosen block address for writing public data is determined
using the free block selection protocol while removing its corresponding
address from the PFL. The two cases are indistinguishable since an actual
access to DL-ORAM and the FBM is indistinguishable from a simulation.
Storing metadata for encryption. Since encryption is performed at
the block level and the reverse mapping array contain an entry for each
disk block, the IVs/counters for the randomized semantically secure cipher
used to encrypt the physical blocks are stored in the reverse mapping
array.
Optimization: in-place updates for public data. When a pub-
lic block is written for the first time (insert), it requires searching for a
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Figure 9: Free block selection protocol for public writes in DataLair Full. Step
1 is indistinguishable for the two cases since simulation to the FBM is indistin-
guishable from a real access. Using either the PFL or the free block selection
protocol in step 2 provides uniformly random block addresses of blocks that do
not contain public data. The entry selected by the selection protocol in step 2
will be at a random index in the FMA as all entries in the FBM are randomized
independent of their locations in the FMA.
Figure 10: DataLair full design with the four main components: DL-ORAM,
PPM, PFL and FBM. Hidden data I/O is mapped through DL-ORAM while
public data I/O is mapped through the PPM. The public data inserts and up-
dates simulates an access to the DL-ORAM. In ONLY PUB mode free blocks
are located using the PFL.
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random free block as described above, but subsequent updates can be
made in-place, thus avoiding additional accesses for finding free blocks
and updating the PPM.
Storing the stash. The in-memory stash is stored to the disk at a
graceful power-down. DataLair Full allocates a fixed location to store
the constant-sized stash. On power-down, the stash is written encrypted
to that location. If the stash is empty or not being used (in case of
ONLY PUB mode), DataLair Full writes random data instead of the
stash for indistinguishability. On boot-up, the stash is read to memory
and reencrypted.
Figure 10 illustrates the DataLair Full design.
Security. DataLair Full derives its security properties straightforwardly
from DataLair Lite. First, note that the only difference between the
schemes is that public data and hidden data coexist in the same physi-
cal address space. Public data is mapped randomly, independent of the
locations where hidden data is already stored. This is ensured by the
free block selection mechanism. The PPM and the PFL (added in this
construction) are public data and do not need to be protected.
Similar to the Lite construction, hidden writes through DL-ORAM
are either performed with public writes (inserts and updates) or simu-
lated indistinguishably. This provides HWA indistinguishability. Further,
as shown above, the ONLY PUB mode of operation is indistinguishable
from the PUB HID mode for DataLair Full. This ensures PAT indis-
tinguishability. As shown before, these are the necessary and sufficient
conditions for PD.
6 Evaluation
Implementation. We implemented DataLair Full as a kernel module
device mapper, a Linux based framework for mapping blocks in logical
volumes to physical blocks. The default cipher used is AES-256 in counter
mode with individual per-block random IVs. Underlying hardware blocks
are 512 bytes each and 8 adjacent hardware blocks constitute a DataLair
“physical block”. Logical and physical block sizes are 4KB.
DataLair was benchmarked with two logical volumes (one public and
one hidden) using an ext4 filesystem in ordered mode (metadata jour-
naling) on top. Each volume was allocated a logical size of 25% of the
underlying device capacity. This ensures that the combined size of the
logical volumes is 50% of the device, thus ensuring that 50% of the de-
vice is always free. Throughput was compared against Hive [7] as well
dm-crypt, a commonly used linux device mapper for full disk encryption.
Platform. Benchmarks were conducted on Linux boxes with Intel Core
i7-3520M processors running at 2.90GHz and 6GB+ of DDR3 DRAM.
The storage device was a 1TB Samsung-850 Evo SSD. Logical volume sizes
were set 64GB while DataLair was built on a 256GB physical partition.
Benchmarking was performed using Bonnie++ [1] on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS,
kernel version 3.13.6. Benchmarking for Hive [7] was performed with the
same parameters by compiling the open source project [2].
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Access dm-crypt DataLair HIVE [7]
Public Read 225.56 84.1 0.88
Public Write 210.10 2.00 0.57
Hidden Read n/a 6.00 5.36
Hidden Write n/a 2.92 0.60
Table 1: Throughput Comparison (MB/s). Higher is better. DataLair perfor-
mance for public data reads is practical when compared to dm-crypt and almost
100x faster than existing work [7]. For hidden data writes, DataLair is 5x faster.
Access dm-crypt DataLair HIVE [7]
Public Read .007 .018 1
Hidden Read n/a .10 .19
Public Write .7 25 332
Hidden Write n/a 92 219
Table 2: Latency Comparison (in seconds). Lower is better. DataLair is 100x
faster than HIVE [7] for public reads and almost 10x faster public writes.
System caches were flushed in between tests. All tests were run 3
times and results collected with 95% confidence interval. DataLair stores
all internal data structures persistently. The in-memory stash used was
constrained to 50 4KB blocks (200KB of data).
Throughput. Table 1 shows throughput comparison for DataLair,
HIVE and dm-crypt. Public reads feature a throughput of about 85MB/s,
100x faster than existing work [7] and only 2.5x slower than dm-crypt. The
speedup results from the fact that public reads do not need to use the
ORAM. Note that the PPM stil needs to be accessed first for determining
the physical location of the logical block. This additional synchronous
access results in the overhead when compared to dm-crypt.
Public writes simulate a DL-ORAM access. The improved write com-
plexity of DL-ORAM compared to HIVE-ORAM [7] results in a 4x speedup.
Later we show how to optimize this further for more practical use. Simi-
larly, hidden writes for DataLair are almost 5x faster than HIVE. Hidden
reads perform comparably to HIVE since the overall read complexity is
asymptotically the same for DL-ORAM and HIVE-ORAM [7].
Latency. Table 2 shows the latency comparison for DataLair, HIVE and
dm-crypt. Expectedly, DataLair public reads are almost 100x faster than
HIVE [7]. It also interesting to note that DataLair public writes are almost
15x faster than HIVE [7]. This is due to the reduced number of I/Os that
needs to be performed per access due to the better write-complexity of
DL-ORAM.
Writing hidden data with public updates. A straightforward opti-
mization for DataLair is to use only public updates (in-place) for hidden
writes/simulations, avoiding the expensive free block selection. In fact,
since filesystem block access patterns typically follows a zipfian distribu-
tion [16] – only a small group of existing blocks are accessed/updated
frequently – an update to a group of already existing public data blocks is
more likely than inserting new data. Also, since filesystems do not indi-
cate deletes to the device, once the public volume is completely occupied,
all subsequent operations during the lifetime of the disk will be treated as
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Figure 11: Variations in public write throughput vs. the public write to private
write ratio. The x-axis represents the number of public writes that are performed
in between two private writes/simulation. The throughput plateaus at around
12 MB/s, around 6x faster than the configuration where hidden writes are made
with each public write. The benefits of performing hidden writes only with
updates is visible even in this case.
updates by the device mapper.
Frequency of Hidden Writes. DataLair features a solution for PD-
CPA (Section 3) where the number of hidden operations performed with
each public operation, φ = 1. For real world applications, it is reasonable
to assume that a user will access hidden data less often that public data.
In that case, φ can be configured according to an estimated workload to
improve the public write throughput.
Figure 11 shows the variations in the public write throughput while in-
creasing the public write to private write ratio. The throughput achieves
a maximum of around 12MB/s when hidden writes/simulations are made
every 10 public writes (inserts and updates). When hidden writes/simulations
are performed only with updates (as described above), the write through-
put achieves a maximum of around 30MB/s, around 40x faster than
HIVE [7]. Note that since HIVE [7] uses a write-only ORAM for public
writes, excluding hidden writes for a fraction of the public writes does not
result in significant gains when compared to the overhead of the ORAM.
Although, DataLair is still 7x slower than dm-crypt (Table 1), the addi-
tional PD guarantees over full disk encryption makes this acceptable in
practice.
7 Conclusion
This work shows that it is not necessary to sacrifice performance to
achieve plausible deniability (PD), even in the presence of a powerful
multi-snapshot adversary. DataLair is a block device with practical per-
formance and PD assurances, designed around a new efficient write-only
ORAM construction. DataLair public data reads are two orders of mag-
nitude faster than existing approaches while accesses to hidden data are
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5 times faster. For more restricted settings, DataLair can achieve public
data write performance almost 50x faster than existing work.
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A DL-ORAM Protocols
input : logical block address id
1 root:= //determine B+ tree root address from fixed location on disk;
2 depth := logβ(N);
3 index := βdepth;
4 while not at leaf do
5 root := // child # ⌊ id
index
⌋;
6 // Search subtree rooted at root;
7 blk = // Read physical block corresponding to root;
8 depth := depth− 1;
9 index := index/β;
10 end
11 addr := // entry for B in root;
12 blk := // Read block from disk with address addr;
return: Decrypt(blk)
Algorithm 1: read oram(id)
input : logical block address id,data d
1 root:= //determine B+ tree root address from fixed location on disk;
2 depth := logβ(N);
3 index := βdepth;
4 while not at leaf do
5 root := // child # ⌊ id
index
⌋;
6 // Search subtree rooted at root;
7 blk = // Read physical block corresponding to root;
8 depth := depth− 1;
9 index := index/β;
10 end
11 // Find free block for new write // ;
12 new blk id := // Find free block ;
13 disk.Write(new blk id,d) ;
14 Map.updateMap(id, new blk id) ;
Algorithm 2: write oram(β, d)
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input : logical block address for map node id, physical block address where
map node is written new blk id
1 root := //Determine from fixed location;
2 if at root then
3 // Update new root address at fixed location //
4 else
5 l := // READ leaf node for id;
6 id := // ID for leaf node;
7 // Update l with new mapping for id;
8 write oram(id, l);
Algorithm 3: Map.updateMap(id, new blk id)
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